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Speaker: James Q. Wilson, Ronald Reagan Professor of Public Policy, Pepperdine University
James Q. Wilson began his first lecture of the Tanner Lecture series on the polarization of American politics, culture and society by remarking that "the election in 2004 left our country deeply divided over whether the country is deeply divided" (Wilson 1, 1). Some scholars such as Morris Fiorina argue that although it may be true that elites are divided, this does not hold true of the American voters who “on issues such as abortion and homosexuality…think pretty much alike.” Wilson disagrees; he believes that polarization runs deeper. “My view reflects my difficulty in imagining that the key political institutions - Congress, the media, and interest groups - operate in an ideological vacuum” (Wilson 1, 16). It is, in fact, the American people that have become deeply divided.
To support his argument, he cites the increasingly hostile tone that opponents use to characterize each other’s personality, opinions and views. On particular political issues, differences in opinion can be dramatic: a Gallup Poll of early 2005 showed a vast divide between President Bush’s approval rating among Republicans (94%) and Democrats (18%). Wilson observes that this is “the largest gap in the history of Gallup Polls.” Moreover, he cites a mid-2005 CBS/New York Times Gallup Poll in which he finds major “divisions between Democrats and Republicans on some key questions,” such as whether invading Iraq was the right thing to do (Democrats 22%; Republicans 78%); whether things in Iraq are going reasonably well (Democrats 20%; Republicans 69%); whether it is alright to have a baby out of wedlock (Democrats 63%; Republicans 42%); or support for stem cell research (Democrats 72%; Republicans 49%).
Wilson claims that this polarization is fundamentally different from the “mere” political divisions of the past. Although America was divided in the years from 1948 to 1996, for instance, it was not what he would call “polarized.” He defines polarization as the “intense commitment to a candidate, culture, or an ideology” that finds expression in the negation and demonization of the opposing side. “That commitment is revealed when a losing candidate is regarded not simply as wrong but as corrupt or wicked, when one culture is regarded as morally superior to every other one, or when one set of political beliefs are thought to be entirely correct and a rival set as wholly wrong” (Wilson 1, 1).
Wilson offers three possible reasons for the increase in political polarization: the changing politics of Congress; the new competitiveness of the mass media; and the emergence of new interest groups.
Wilson elaborates on his first point by citing the deep division between Republicans and Democrats on Clinton’s impeachment in 1998; Clinton’s budget, which passed the House in 1993 “without a single Republican voting for it”; and taxes. These, he claims, are evidence that “since 1950 there has been a steady increase in the percentage of votes in Congress that pit a majority of Democrats against a majority of Republicans” (Wilson 1, 8). Whereas there used to be a number of liberal conservatives and conservative liberals, in the new constellation the center has vanished, leaving only two polar opposite sides. “Conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans are an endangered species, now approaching extinction” (Wilson 1, 9). Accompanying the deep party-split there has been a sharp increase in congressional incivility. Wilson admits that this cannot be compared to the time when “members of Congress not only made the most scandalous remarks about one another, on occasion they beat their rivals with canes and fists.” Nevertheless, whereas between 1953 and the early 1990s there was seldom need for a representative’s words to be ruled out of order or read back to give the representative the opportunity to have them struck from the record, “between 1995 and 1997 there was a sharp upturn in both measures” (Wilson 1, 10).
Wilson’s second contention is that the mass media ignites polarization; in times past when there were few television stations and news programs and radio stations were prohibited from airing controversial views, the media tended to gravitate to the political center. These days, mass media is geared toward being adversary. “Today the media have many lines of access and they reflect the maximization of controversy and the cultivation of niche markets. Once the media talked to us; now they shout at us” (Wilson 1, 14).
Finally, interests groups used to constitute themselves around material and economic issues; today, they also constitute themselves around social and cultural ones, such as human rights and moral questions. The early groups had the “advantage” of being in principle open to compromise. However, interests groups divided on social, cultural and moral issues, which Wilson refers to as “postmodern”, “find compromise very difficult if not impossible” (Wilson 1, 15).
Wilson answers the question as to why polarization “has spread beyond political elites into the opinions of many ordinary Americans” (Wilson 1, 7) by arguing that elite polarization trickles down to “the people” in proportion to their level of political awareness. An increase in the level of education brings increased political awareness and increased susceptibility to political cues. “Politically aware people are more likely to be well-educated people, and the level of formal schooling in this country has been going up. And politically aware people are more likely to pay attention to the mass media” (Wilson 1, 19). In addition to making people more politically aware, and therefore more open to political cues, higher levels of education also lead to a disaggregation between wealth and political interests. “For voters up through college graduates, having higher incomes means becoming more conservative. But once one has a postgraduate education, the wealth effect vanishes” (Wilson, 25).
Wilson cites a study by John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira which suggests that people in the professions have similarly changed their voting behavior; whereas formerly professionals voted like business managers, today professionals such as teachers, nurses and software designers identify more with their knowledge than with their professional allegiance.
So why are we worried about polarization? Wilson believes that polarization is a destructive development both at home and in the realm of foreign relations; domestically, polarization marks the road to a disenchanted populace, distrustful of, and alienated from, politics and its government; internationally, polarization leads to an intolerable subversion of national credibility and power in the eyes of the “enemy”.
Introducing the question and answer period, Professor Liz Cohen basically agreed with Wilson’s premise that America is divided. She wanted to know if Wilson thought it possible to make the debate more rational again; she also wondered whether coalition politics may have been rendered impossible through the social movements of the 1960s, such as feminism and the civil rights movement, and whether the process of politics, with its marketing, advertising and targeted campaigning strategies may be making it increasingly difficult to find common ground. Wilson said he could imagine three rather unlikely scenarios which might bring about a more rational debate: if the scale of government were radically reduced; if a new redistricting plan were implemented; and finally, if people were to relax and spend less time becoming agitated about political debates. Wilson did not think that the social movements of the 60s made coalition government impossible, or that there was anything particularly irrational about our expensive campaigns and marketing strategies.
There followed a lively discussion with the audience. There was certainly no polarization as to whether polarization needs to be discussed (to affirm, debate, reformulate or reject the idea). Reaction to Wilson’s argument came from three sources: those who wondered what kind of polarization was taking place in the U.S.; those who questioned whether polarization was indeed the phenomenon occurring in America; those who questioned whether polarization, if indeed it was taking place, was such a bad thing.
Two illustrative examples: President Larry Summers wanted to know what exactly Wilson meant by polarization, since this characterization of the situation could denote at least two different distributions of opinion - with very different implications. He pointed out that polarization need not mean anything quite as radical as what Wilson was suggesting; that, on the contrary, one could call a country polarized and “merely” be referring to the fact that on both sides of the political spectrum some ideas have grown more extreme; that, in other words, it was quite possible that the country is not deeply divided but that there are just more, and more extreme, views shared by some at both ends of the political spectrum. Wilson said that his evidence points to a polarization in the form of a deep division and not merely the broadening of the range of political opinions.
Others wondered why a Wilsonian polarization of the U.S. – assuming it to be the case – was problematic; polarization, they suggested could be considered a welcome expression of “spirited” democratic debate. This prompted Wilson to talk about the harmful effect such polarization could have on the credibility of the nation in the eyes of the rest of the world.