Corruption poses two distinct dangers. First, it may prevent institutions from serving their proper ends, as happens when a bribe leads an inspector to overlook a dangerous violation. Second, perceptions of corruption can lead to a lack of trust in institutions themselves, further undermining their public value. Combating corruption, however, is easier said than done. Corruption can take many different forms, depending on the industry or context, and strategies of oversight can sometime be more costly than corruption itself. Moreover, public perceptions of corruption may not reflect the reality on the ground. Bill English's project responds to these broad concerns through three related, but discreet, studies. The first consists of a theoretical examination of the varieties of corruption, which will aim to clarify the economic logic of corruption in different domains (e.g. information asymmetries, principal-agent problems, conflicts of interest, rent seeking) as well as the normative criteria by which particular economies of influence are judged illegitimate. In addition to providing a useful overview of problems of corruption, this study will suggest agendas for research and reform appropriate to different institutional contexts. The second study will use surveys to investigate perceptions of corruption within particular industries (such as finance, medicine, and government) as well as amongst the public at large. These surveys will help establish: 1) what those working within these industries perceive as the greatest challenges of corruption and 2) whether public perceptions accurately reflect concerns expressed by industry insiders. Additionally, the surveys will help characterize public rationales for trust and distrust across different industries, which is an important precondition for addressing deficits in public trust. The third study will examine the comparative advantages of relying on personal ethics versus explicit incentives in addressing particular problems of corruption. Both strategies have strengths and weaknesses, but cultivating and relying on ethical convictions may be especially useful in those areas where incentive design is infeasible. This study will include an experimental component designed to test methods for eliciting costly ethical behavior.
Although these studies respond to specific scholarly debates and will be published independently, their results will ultimately inform a larger book project examining "corruption and the architecture of public trust."
Relevant Publications:
- English, William. "Demystifying Trust: Experimental Evidence from Cambodia and Thailand" Journal of Theoretical Politics (forthcoming) .
- English, William. "The Compartmentalization of Moral Inspiration" in Proceedings of the 36th St. Gallen Symposium. Switzerland: St. Gallen Press, 2006.
Attribution: http://www.flickr.com/photos/library_of_congress/4427431800/