Political Money and the Crisis in Political Representation

In this project, Paul Jorgensen will conduct an empirical and normative project investigating how the industrial structure of the American economy influences the partisan control of Congress and the public policy emanating from this legislative body, from 1990 through 2010. The specific questions guiding this research include: (1) what are and what explains electoral and lobbying coalitions between organized interests and political parties across time, which are defined broadly to include all types of campaign contributions, lobbying contracts, and contents of congressional member stock portfolios, and (2) what are the legislative and economic effects of these coalitions across time?

Answering these questions requires a focus on the influence of political money, the deployment of wealth and money in politics to attain desired goals, in congressional coalition and public policy formation. Investment theory is the predominant research program seeking knowledge of causal links between industrial structure, political-money coalitions, and public policy (e.g., Ferguson 1995), and Paul proposes to use and extend this theory to encompass congressional politics. This theory expects, in political systems reliant on money to operate, public policy outcomes to diverge from the needs of most citizens, and systematically documenting this monetary influence in congressional decision-making would be a significant step towards convincing academics and the public of our representation crisis, the crafting of rules and regulations to benefit the wealthy at the cost of the public good. The normative aspect of this project seeks to develop tools that empower citizens to correct this apparent representation crisis. To begin this empowerment process, Paul proposes to develop a website that would extend the amount of publicly accessible information beyond the existing offerings of other monetary-disclosure sites.

Attribution: http://www.flickr.com/photos/f-l-e-x/1449291608/