The first Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics Lab seminar of the 2014-2015 academic year convened on September 9, 2014, and was led by the Center’s Director, Professor Lawrence Lessig. During this introductory seminar, Lessig laid the framework for his definition of institutional corruption, discussed some common terminology relevant to this definition, and presented participants of the Lab seminar with several examples of its occurrence.
Lessig opened the seminar by contrasting his definition of institutional corruption with that of Dennis Thompson’s earlier conception of the term. Unlike Thompson’s definition, which characterizes institutional corruption as political gain by public officials under conditions that in general tend to promote private interests, Lessig’s definition encompasses a type of corruption that occurs when institutions develop improper dependencies, resulting in a loss of public trust and a weakening of the effectiveness of those institutions. In this new definition, two fundamental concepts emerge: Independence and trust. Independence, or the effectiveness of an institution to perform its intended function free from improper influences, must be maintained in order for the trust of an institution to be secured. In that respect, trust can be considered a function of independence. To illustrate this idea, Lessig analogized institutional corruption to a compass deviating from magnetic north because of the improper influence of a magnet. He explained that such a deviation could be understood as a corruption of the intended purpose of the compass. And because of this improper dependence, our trust or confidence in the compass is compromised.
In thinking about independence in the context of institutional corruption, Lessig characterized it as the same type of independence the Framers’ sought to establish with the Constitution: a set of institutions free of improper dependencies. Specifically, the Framers’ conceived of a Congress that would be “dependent on the people alone,” just as an independent judiciary is dependent upon the law. In the case of our current Congress—one that is increasingly dependent on campaign funders—it becomes clear that the institution has deviated far from the Framers' original conception of exclusive representation dependent on the people. Simply put, this is corruption relative to the baseline. As a result of this new and improper dependency, the policies and voting behaviors of members of Congress subtly bend in favor of their funders, rather than their constituents. What is more, the mere presence of money in the wrong place erodes public confidence in the institution and fuels an underlying cynicism of Congress.
At this point in the seminar, participants of the Lab began to discuss the significance of defining a baseline for institutions when considering the prevalence of institutional corruption. Some participants questioned if this baseline should simply be considered a counterfactual to corruption, while others debated if institutional corruption should be contemplated from a normative or descriptive perspective. Lessig explained that he ascribes to a descriptive conception of institutional corruption, one that is relativistic, in which a baseline is identified from a procedural standpoint. In this view, the concept of institutional corruption could only function when an institution has a purpose, or standards that can are “corruptible.”
- Summary composed by Joseph Hollow