The first Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics Lab seminar of the 2013-14 academic year convened on September 9, 2013, and was led by the Center's Director, Professor Lawrence Lessig. Intended as an introductory seminar, Lessig laid the framework for his conception of institutional corruption and presented to the participants of the Lab seminar several examples of its occurrence. Lessig began his presentation with a simple, yet powerful analogy of a compass deviating from magnetic north under the influence of a lodestone to institutional corruption. He explained that such a deviation could be understood as a corruption of the intended purpose of the compass. And because of this improper dependence, our trust in the veracity or accuracy of the compass is compromised. Such is the case in the formal definition of institutional corruption, he explained, as when institutions develop improper dependencies, resulting in a loss of necessary public trust and a weakening of the effectiveness of those institutions. This can be characterized as a certain type of influence within an economy of influence. In the context of this definition of institutional corruption, two fundamental concepts emerge: independence and trust. Independence, or the effectiveness of an institution to perform its intended function free from improper influences, (think the compass's ability to point us in the direction of magnetic north) must be maintained in order for the trust of an institution to be secured. In that respect, trust can be considered a function of independence.
Continuing with the presentation, Lessig spent some time addressing the ways in which his definition of institutional corruption differs from that of Dennis Thompson's earlier conception of the term, which has been defined as political gain by public officials under conditions that in general tend to promote private interests. Lessig then pointed to Congress as a primary example of an institution fitting his new definition. In particular, he argued that Congress has evolved from the Framers' original conception of representation that "should be dependent on the people alone," to representation that now has conflicting dependencies on campaign funders and the people. To frame this, he explained how a condition to running in the general election is that one must do exceedingly well in the "money election." In short, this new conflicting dependency undermines the Framers' original conception of exclusive representation dependent upon the people. Perhaps most troubling, however, is the subtle and understated "bending" effect this dependence on campaign contributors produces in policy implemented by representatives who find themselves beholden to private interests. Members of Congress become "shape-shifters" as they spend 30-70% of their time calling a fraction of the 1% for campaign contributions, which undoubtedly influences their voting habits.
Following Professor Lessig's presentation, participants of the Lab engaged in a lively discussion that centered on establishing a baseline for institutional corruption, differentiating organizational dysfunction from institutional corruption, and identifying proper versus improper dependencies in institutions. There was discussion about the difficulties of defining institutional independence in the private sector, as well as the importance of mission statements to the integrity of public companies. Members of the Lab agreed that measuring deviation from an institution's espoused purposes, as well as an institution's ability to maintain integrity by living up to core processes would be key factors in evaluating future cases of institutional corruption.
-Summary composed by Joseph Hollow