The first Lab Seminar of the 2012 Spring Semester was led by Jennifer Bussell, Edmond J. Safra Lab Fellow and Assistant Professor of Public Policy at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas. Her research attempts to measure the scale and scope of corruption in India, a federalist country with 28 states that vary dramatically in their levels of corruption.
Bussell opened the seminar by providing some institutional context, describing a system in which lateral transfers are often controlled by politicians, with an established “market” for public office. When people want to move to a lateral position, they usually pay a bribe to get it. Bribes are also used in judicial proceedings, and by citizens for more efficient access to services.
Much of the seminar discussion focused on the issue of bribes, as well as the extent to which it is (or isn’t) possible to draw connections between the corruption that occurs in Indian society, and that which we find in the United States. Participants wondered about perceptions of corruption in India, and how those might be shifting given the recent publicity around Anna Hazare, and the 0 rupee note. It was noted that many wealthier citizens do not mind having to pay bribes, because it allows them better (and quicker) access to government services.
Others brought up the point that in the US, we are often able to pay extra money to expedite services (e.g. expedited passport processing), though that money does not go directly into the pockets of government employees as it does in India. It was pointed out that while in both cases, money is being paid to receive faster service, in the US, the price is public, and can be turned into a political questions, whereas with bribes, it’s not something that can be legislated.
Bussell closed by offering some potential solutions, including campaign finance reform, bureaucracy reforms (including restructuring the transfer system for state and Indian administrative services ) and shaming programs, such as the 0 rupee note. Participants were particularly interested in whether shaming could be an effective vehicle for reform, especially in a society where it seems that bribes have long since become an acceptable part of doing business. Others pointed out the importance of thinking about ways of implementing shaming that don’t put the people doing the shaming at risk of retaliation.
Even so, it was noted that when the whole system is dysfunctional, reform attempts that shame the individual seem to miss the point. It was suggested that when thinking about reforming corruption, it is necessary to think beyond punishing the individuals who engage in corrupt behavior, and instead consider changing the environment that sustains the corrupt behavior.